While the idea of regime change is often demonized as reckless adventurism or imperialistic hubris, it has a place in American foreign policy when it serves our national security interests. When autocratic regimes threaten our nation’s existence, it is right and morally just to use force to oust them.
The problem with regime change as a policy tool is that it rarely works. First, it sets a dangerous precedent for other states to pursue covert or overt regime change. It is no accident that the tyrannical dictators of the Cold War era or of our own time react with hysteria to any hint of U.S.-inspired regime instability, whether in the form of a “color revolution” or a threat to their very survival.
Second, once an externally imposed leader is in power, they have a domestic audience in addition to their patrons, and the two seldom want the same things. The result is that imposed leaders tend to be uncooperative and self-serving, alienating both their domestic audience and the people in their host country in the process.
The prevailing consensus among scholars is that regime-change operations typically end up making matters worse, not better. For those in the policy community who seek to address the plight of nations like Venezuela, it is essential that they read and understand these studies before rushing to implement policies that have a track record of failure. Those who are serious about solving these problems should also recognize that the concept of “regime change” as a policy instrument is a departure from Westphalian sovereignty, in which nation-states enjoy a presumption of sovereignty over what happens within their borders.
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